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Summary 
This paper considers the fate of Norwegian firms in their first decade after entry. The 
underlying dynamics of entry and exit play an important part in the growth and development 
of an economy. On the one hand, there is net entry of firms in some industries or sectors and 
down-sizing in others to adapt to changing economic realities, such as demand shifts and 
relocation of production. On the other hand, there is a considerable excess turnover of firms 
within industries, which some researchers have explained as productivity-based sorting. This 
means that the entry and exit of different firms are intrinsically linked. The survival and 
growth of some comes at the expense of others. 
This paper will consider the following problems: 1) What is the duration dependence of the 
exit hazard of an individual firm? Is the duration dependence positive or negative? 2) Can we 
observe any differences between the duration dependence of different types of exits? 3) What 
factors other than age can contribute to an explanation of why some firms exit while other 
survive? Are there differences in how these factors impact the risk of different types of exit? 
Economic theory provides several different mechanisms that may account for differences in 
firm exit rates. Vintage theories emphasize the age of capital and rate of technological 
innovation. These are also known as theories of creative destruction or Schumpeterian 
growth. They predict an increasing exit hazard in the age of capital. Theories of learning can 
be divided into passive “learning about ones relative quality through market feedback” and 
active “learning-by-doing” (improvement in quality with time and experience). Passive 
learning is treated explicitly in this analysis, by both taking into account the observed 
differences and modeling the unobserved differences that exist between firms. These 
differences mean that firms are of different quality and have differing exit risks. This creates a 
sorting process. Since "low quality" firms tend to exit earlier than higher quality firms, we get 
a selection process that makes the “gross” observed exit hazard (i.e. ignoring differences in 
quality) decline in firm age. In addition to the two groups of theories mentioned above, 
business cycles and sector shifts have effects on the entry and exit of firms that differ by year 
and by industry/sector. These effects are not the focus of my analysis, but are controlled for 
by year and sector dummies. 
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The analysis has a particularly rich categorization of the different types of entries and exits. 
Using a comprehensive set of register data, we are able to distinguish between the plant and 
the firm level. This allows us to control for different types of entries, and identify those cases 
where the plant survives an exiting firm. We are also able to distinguish bankruptcies from 
other exits. The identification of different types of firm exit is exploited in two models of 
competing risks. Using a model with competing risks, we are also able to identify differences 
in the factors associated with different types of exit. 
To decompose the gross exit rate I use a series of proportional hazard models with parametric 
and non-parametric assumptions regarding the unobserved heterogeneity. One of the models 
assumes that the unobserved heterogeneity in the sample is gamma-distributed. This model is 
estimated in a Stata program developed by Jenkins (1997). The other models are non-
parametric in that they estimate a discrete distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity of 
firm. These models are estimated by an R-program developed by Simen Gaure at the Frisch 
Centre. By explicitly modeling the unobserved quality differences between the firms, we are 
able to separate out the selection/sorting effect from the duration dependency facing 
individual firms. The results turn out to be similar for the model with a gamma-distributed 
unobserved heterogeneity and the non-parametric model. 
The analysis is performed in a number of stages. The observed hazard rate of firms is 
declining in firm age. . Taking differences in the observed heterogeneity of firms into 
account, the remaining duration dependency of the exit hazard is not significantly related to 
firm age. Estimating a model with unobserved heterogeneity turns the duration dependence 
strictly positive, which indicates that the exit hazard of firms increases with firm age when 
selection effects are taken into account.  
Introducing competing risk models, I distinguish first between the cases of firm exits where 
the corresponding plant also shuts down ("full exit") and the cases where the plant continues 
under a new firm ("half exit"). I find that the duration dependency of half exits is more 
positive than that of full exits, meaning that a continuation of the plant after firm exit is 
relatively more common if the firm is older at time of exit. In the second competing risks 
model, bankruptcy is distinguished from other firm liquidations. The results indicate that 
bankruptcies differ significantly  from other liquidations. First, the bankruptcy hazard has no 
discernible duration dependency, our results are not significantly different from one where the 
risk of bankruptcy is constant with firm age given firm quality. This suggests that the positive 
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duration dependency of the total exit hazard is driven solely by the non-bankrupt exits. 
Second, the observed differences between firms, such as employment and debt-to-equity in 
the year of entry, are associated in starkly differing ways with patterns of bankruptcy hazard 
compared to liquidation hazard. For example, a firm with negative ratio of debt-to-equity has 
a substantially higher risk of bankruptcy than a firm with moderate debt-to-equity, but seems 
to have lower risk of a non-bankrupt exit.  
Some of the results were significant in interesting ways. Interestingly, a high share of female 
employees in the year of entry is associated with a lower risk of bankruptcy. The results in the 
single risk model indicates no relationship between the initial employment size and the exit 
hazard. This surprising finding can be explained in the competing risks model, where the 
employment size has opposite effects on bankrupt and non-bankrupt exits. High employment 
is associated with a reduced risk of bankruptcy and a higher risk of liquidation. The 
competing risk models demonstrates that ignoring the distinctions between types of exits 
obscures underlying differences in the duration dependencies for different types of exits.  
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1 Introduction 
The entry and exit of different firms are intrinsically linked. The survival and growth of some 
comes at the expense of others, and the underlying dynamics of entry and exit play an 
important part in the growth and development of an economy. On the one hand, there is net 
entry of firms in some industries or sectors and down-sizing in others to adapt to changing 
economic realities, such as demand shifts and relocation of production. On the other hand, 
there is a considerable excess turnover of firms within industries, which some researchers 
have explained as productivity-based sorting. Huse (2009), for instance, has shown that the 
entry and exit of firms contributes significantly to the overall productivity growth in the 
economy, especially in times of economic slow-down, as low-productivity firms exit while 
firms with higher productivity enter the marked. Foster et al. (2006) finds that net entry of 
firms accounts for the majority of the changes in labour productivity in the U.S. retail trade 
sector. An overview of the research on productivity and turnover is found in Caves (1998). 
The productivity enhancing effect of entry and exit is a combination of factors within and 
between firms. I will discuss this with reference to the differing quality of firms, quality here 
referring to the post-entry performance of firms in terms of productivity or profitability. On 
the one hand, a firm can be forced to exit because it has a permanently lower quality than the 
other firms in the market. This is the process of selection, the quality firms survive while the 
low quality firms exit. The selection process can also be referred to as passive learning. On 
the other hand, when new firms with increasingly higher quality then the older firms enters 
the market, the old firms that were once the best of their kind will be forced to exit. This 
process is discussed in vintage theories of firm entry and exit. 
Theories on firm entry and exit can be broadly grouped in two branches, vintage theories and 
learning theories (Dale-Olsen, 2005). The vintage theories are also known as theories of 
creative destruction or Schumpeterian growth. They are based on the notion that new 
productive capital is required in order to make use of technological innovations. Old capital is 
thus less productive than new capital, and more so the higher the rate of technological 
progress. Old capital is thus a proxy for low efficiency (Salvanes and Tveteras, 2004). For 
each new step in the process of technological innovation, some old capital with old 
technology will be rendered unprofitable by the entry of new, more productive methods. A 
firm with old unprofitable capital will either exit, or invest in a renewal of capital. The vintage 
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theories predict an increasing exit hazard in the age of capital. Testing this theory could be 
based on the assumption of a link between firm age and capital age. Dale-Olsen (2005) finds 
support for the vintage theories when modelling the exit hazard of plants based on data for a 
period of forty years. He finds that the hazard function is significantly increasing in plant age. 
Salvanes and Tveteras (2004) present an analysis where the distinction between the age of 
capital and firm age is made explicit. They have access to detailed investment data which 
makes it possible to compute a measure of capital age based on past investments. The 
estimation results strongly support a separation of capital age and plant age, as the learning 
and capital replacement effects work in opposite directions with respect to exit probability. 
The likelihood of plant shutdown is significantly decreasing and convex in plant age and 
significantly increasing in the age of machine capital (Salvanes and Tveteras, 2004).  
The second group of theories on entry and exit contains theories of learning or experience. 
When a new firm enters the marked, two learning processes are commenced, referred to as 
passive and active learning. In passive learning, the firm learns about its own profitability, 
based on both its own quality and the actual economic circumstances it faces after entry. 
Some potential entrepreneurs have ideas that they decide not to carry out, because the 
business prospects are too risky or because the expected profitability is not sufficiently high. 
These "unborn firms" are obviously never observed. Other ideas are considered good enough 
to be given a chance. Still, unresolved uncertainties remain which cannot be known before 
entry. In the first few years after entry, the entering firms learn whether they are viable or not. 
If the expected future profits are too low, the firms exit. This creates a selection process.  
The firms with low profitability, the "bad" firms, will have a higher probability of exit at any 
given point. On average, they will also exit earlier than the "good" firms. The good firms will 
therefore constitute a rising share of the population of remaining firms as they get older. Thus, 
if the selection process of passive learning was the only force affecting the duration 
dependence of firm survival, the exit rates would be decreasing in age. Jovanovic (1982) 
illustrates the selection process through a model of noisy selection, in which the cost function 
is not only unknown to the firm before entry, it also differs from firm to firm. Dale-Olsen 
(2005) follow the cohort of plants established in 1996 during their first seven years. The exit 
probability for small firms, with maximum ten employees, falls from more than 20 percent the 
first year to eight percent for the seventh year. The exit hazard for small firms is rapidly 
declining in age, at least until the sixth year, but for the larger firms there is no clear trend 
(ibid).  
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The gross hazard rate is the average exit hazard of the remaining firms in the sample at any 
given age. This rate seems to fall over a firm's first few years, which is often interpreted as the 
selection effect dominating the gross hazard during the early years of a plant's life-cycle. 
Though passive learning takes place within individual firms, the effect on the exit hazard over 
time is at the firm population level. It pulls the observed gross exit rate in the direction of 
declining hazard as firm age increases. But the passive learning does not alter the hazard 
facing an individual firm, except in that the firm can be increasingly confident that it has high 
quality as it ages, because age is depending on survival up to the present.  
The other learning process is active learning within each firm. The idea is that the firm quality 
is gradually improved over time by experience and increasing knowledge. The firm learns 
about its economic environment and the business it has entered, and adapts by improving 
decision making, management and production processes. Both active and passive learning 
causes the expected exit hazard of any individual firm to decrease in age. Passive learning has 
this effect because the expected exit hazard increases when we know the firm has already 
survived a number of years, survival indicates that the firm is of higher quality than the 
average entering firm. Active learning has a direct effect on the quality of the individual firm, 
and as the quality increases, the exit hazard decreases.  
The theories can be seen as complementary theories describing different processes and thus 
different forces at work. They may be applicable to different time periods, different parts of a 
firm's life-cycle, and they may depend to varying degrees on factors such as industry 
characteristics, speed of innovation and technology. In a capital intensive sector with rapid 
technological growth the effect of creative destruction is likely to kick in at an earlier stage 
than in a labour intensive, static industry. Likewise, learning by doing can be expected to play 
a larger role for a longer time for a firm entering an industry with an advanced, knowledge 
intensive technology. 
This paper will focus on the exit hazard of new firms. The risk of exit varies both across firms 
and within firms over their life-cycle. I will attempt to decompose the gross exit hazard 
observed in the population of firms, separating the selection process from the duration 
dependence of the hazard rate. The duration dependence is the net outcome of a number of 
mechanisms, amongst them the vintage and the active learning effects, which both operate at 
the firm level. However, a number of other factors are likely to influence the duration 
dependence, though these are not usually formally discussed in relation to theories of entry 
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and exit. For example, a dentist running a private practise will often let his firm be liquidated 
when he retires. A restaurant or pub owner might want to start afresh with a new firm 
operating in the same location if the guests seem to get bored with the old concept. Other 
firms are liquidated because the owner want to move on, get a new job, start a new business 
or simply cash out the values in the firm. Considering these alternative motivations for firm 
exit, the picture of what can be expected about the relation between firm age and the 
probability of exit becomes more complex.  
The selection effect, as mentioned, works at the population level, and is caused by differences 
between firms. To the extent that these differences are observable, these differences can be 
controlled for in an analysis of duration dependence. But limitations in our data will always 
leave unobserved heterogeneity; the true quality of an individual firm at time of entry is 
unobservable. The key to overcoming this problem and get past the effect of selection is to 
explicitly take unobserved heterogeneity into account when estimating duration dependence. 
As an extension to the decomposition of exit rates, this paper will also consider whether the 
duration dependence is different for different types of exit. The data allows for a separation of 
different types of firm exits along two dimensions. First, some firm exits are characterized by 
simultaneous plant exits, while in other cases the plant continues under a new firm. Second, 
firms exits due to bankruptcy are separated from non-bankrupt firm exits. 
To summarize the key questions I will attempt to answer: 
1) What is the duration dependence of the exit hazard of an individual firm? Is the duration 
dependence positive or negative? 
2) Can we observe any differences between the duration dependence of different types of 
exits?  
3) What factors other than age can contribute to an explanation of why some firms exit while 
other survive? Are there differences in how these factors impact the risk of different types of 
exit? 
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2 The ideal experiment and an 
executable strategy 
My analysis is based on four different data sets, all originating from Norwegian 
administrative registers. They contain employment data, accounts data, demographic data and 
firm data from the period 1995 to 2005. An overview of the four data sets is found in Table 1. 
I want to look at firm entries and assess which firms turn out successful and which firms exit. 
Ideally, I would have had sufficient information to perfectly characterize the initial and 
constant parameters that are relevant for firm quality and survival. Because I can not know all 
the relevant characteristics of the firms in the sample, an important aspect of this paper is to 
find methods to deal with the unobserved differences between firms. 
Ideally, I would have data on all the Norwegian firms for prolonged period of time. The 
availability of data, however, imposes extensive limitations on the firm population I can use 
in the analysis. On the one hand, I only have data from eleven years, and need two of them for 
defining entry and exit. That leaves me with a maximum of nine observation years per firm. 
On the other hand, there is a trade-off between the wish for a large sample and the wish for 
detailed information about the firms included in the sample. 
At the very core of the notion of a selection effect lies the fact that firms are different. The 
larger the heterogeneity in the firm population, the larger are the consequences of limiting the 
sample if the purpose is to extrapolate the results to the population of firms. For instance, 
missing values for a variable in a register, such as county, industry or sex and age of CEO, 
was found to have a significant positive effect on the estimated exit hazard, meaning that the 
exit hazard is higher for firms with incomplete register data. Thus missing information seems 
to be a bad sign for firm survival. By excluding some firms for which the availability of data 
is insufficient, I am consequently left with a population of higher-quality firms in the analysis. 
Preferably, the data should also allow a separation of capital age and firm age, by containing 
full information on the age of the capital and the technology used in the production processes 
of each firm. As this is not the case, I will not attempt to separate vintage effects from active 
learning in the estimation of duration dependence. The assessment of capital and labour input 
will be discussed later. 
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Lastly, structural changes within and between industries and the market structure in which the 
firm operate is likely to influence the decisions of entry and exit. I use control variables for 
industry and geographical location in order to capture some of the effects from the market 
environment of each firm.  
 
Table 1 - Data sources 
 
 
 
 
Data set Description Years Data type Level Source Limitations
Employment data Details on each employer-employee 
relationship
1995-2005 panel Firm, plant, 
individual
Statistics 
Norway
Does not include 
self-employment
Demographic data Individual characteristics such as 
age, education and sex
1995-2005 panel Individual Statistics 
Norway
Accounts data Annual accounts of Norwegian 
firms
1995-2005 panel Firm Brønnøysund 
Register Centre
Not all firms have 
an obligation to 
report annual 
accounts
Firm data Firm characteristics such as 
industry, county, registration and 
bankruptcy/liquidation dummies
extracted in 
2007
cross-
section
Firm Brønnøysund 
Register Centre
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3 The models 
The starting point for my analysis is the observed, "gross" exit rate in my sample, depicted in 
Figure 1. It peaks at nine percent after three years and then gradually declines to about six 
percent. The first model will control for year effects and known differences between firms, 
such as industry, county, size and characteristics of the employees. I proceed to models which 
explicitly account for unobserved heterogeneity of firms in order to disentangle the selection 
effect from the duration dependence. At last, I distinguish between different types of exits in a 
model with competing risks. 
 
Figure 1 - Observed exit rate, percent 
3.1 The proportional hazards model 
The description of the model set-up is based on Jenkins (1997) and Røed and Westlie (2007). 
I assume that the hazard rate function for firm i  at time 0t >  takes the proportional hazards 
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where 0 ( )tλ  is the baseline hazard function. In a proportional hazard model, the effect of 
covariates can only induce proportional shifts in the hazard rate but can not change its shape 
(Blossfeld et al., 2007). Put differently, the effect of a time-invariant variable is to scale the 
risk profile of a firm up or down proportionally at all points - if it raises the risk at some point 
in time by 10%, it also raises the risk at all other times by 10%. It can not, however, create a 
shift which increases the risk of exit uniformly e.g. with two percentage points at all points in 
time.  
The discrete time representation of the continuous proportional hazard model is also known as 
a complementary log-logistic model (clog-log). While other models, such as the Weibull 
model, force a smoothly increasing or decreasing rate onto the results, the log-logistic model 
allows for a non-monotonic hazard rate. This means that the exit probability in the clog-log 
model used here can be increasing for some periods of time and decreasing in others. On 
discrete form, the time hazard in the j th interval lasting from time 1ja − to ja  can be written as 
 
1
0( ) 1 exp exp( ' )   with  log ( ) ,
j
j
a
j ij ij j j a
h dβ γ γ λ τ τ
−
⎡ ⎤= − − + =⎣ ⎦ ∫x x   
where jγ  represents the duration dependence of the hazard, also called the baseline hazard. 
With a non-parametric baseline hazard with a separate parameter for each duration interval, 
jγ is interpreted as the integral of the baseline hazard over the relevant time interval. It gives 
us the factor by which the hazard function is scaled for each year compared to the reference 
year.  
3.2 Unobserved heterogeneity 
Distinguishing between the effects of type and the effects of time is a main focus in this 
paper. If there is unobserved heterogeneity or omitted variables, the time hazard estimated in 
the basic model will include a selection effect. The idea is that, even after controlling for all 
the observable differences between firms, unobserved quality differences remain, giving some 
firms a higher hazard than other firms. Imagine that half the firms starting up have zero 
probability of failure, while the other half have a 50% chance of failure in any given year. The 
first year, 25% of all the new firms fail. The next year, the bad firms are only a third of the 
remaining firms - so when half of these fail in the second year the overall observed failure rate 
has fallen from 25% in the first year to 1/6 in the second. The next year, the remaining bad 
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firms are only 20% of the surviving population, bringing that year's observed failure rate to 
10%. Every year the failure rate falls - but this is in our example purely a result of permanent 
and fixed quality differences between firms - it's pure selection. Returning to the real world of 
firm exit, there are differences between the firms in our sample that we can not observe. If 
there are differences in the exit probabilities of firms, then as time goes by the low-risk firms 
will make up an increasing share of the firms remaining in the sample. The average exit 
hazard therefore declines, as we could see in Figure 1. 
The presence of unobserved heterogeneity is not unique for event history analysis. But unlike 
for example a cross-section regression, the unobserved heterogeneity in event history analysis 
is not evenly distributed across spell durations. From the outset, ν  is white noise, but as years 
go by, it causes a sorting of firms according to their unobserved differences in quality. This 
results in a spurious negative duration hazard. 
In order to account for the presence of unobserved heterogeneity, the basic model setup is 
extended by adding a firm specific unobserved covariate iε . I then get a mixed proportional 
hazard model where the instantaneous hazard rate is  
 0 ( ) exp( ' )it i ittλ λ ε β= ⋅ ⋅ x  
with the corresponding discrete time hazard function 
 { }( ) 1 exp exp '   where  log( ).j ij ij j i i ih β γ ν ν ε⎡ ⎤= − − + + =⎣ ⎦x x  
In order to estimate this model, some further assumptions on the distribution of ν must be 
made. A Gamma-distribution is often used in the literature. The Gamma-distribution has 
become very popular, at least partially owing to the fact that it simplifies the calculations of 
the model, but also the normal distribution and other are possible. Abbring and Van den Berg 
(2007) presents a rationalization of the preference for the Gamma-distribution in duration 
analysis. However, imposing a Gamma distribution on the unobserved heterogeneity, or for 
that matter any other given distribution, has consequences for the estimated hazard rate. If the 
true distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity in the sample is far from the Gamma 
distribution, imposing such a distribution on the model can bias the estimated duration 
dependence. Because there is no evidence to support the assumption of a Gamma-distribution, 
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I prefer to use a less restrictive model which approximates a discrete distribution of the 
unobserved heterogeneity. 
Nevertheless, I want to check different assumptions about the distribution of unobserved 
heterogeneity and compare it to the model with a discrete distribution. The basic model is the 
reference model, which makes no attempt to filter out the selection effect. I also estimate one 
model which follows the common assumption of Gamma-distributed heterogeneity. In this 
model, ν is a Gamma-distributed random variable with unit mean and variance 2σ . The model 
with Gamma-distributed heterogeneity consequently has one extra parameter compared to the 
basic model, namely the variance of ν  (Jenkins, 1997).  
Approximating the unknown distribution of unobserved heterogeneity by means of a discrete 
distribution is modelled by means of a non-parametric maximum likelihood estimator 
(NPMLE). The model estimation proceeds as follows. First a null-model disregarding 
heterogeneity is estimated. This corresponds to the basic model above. Second, the 
unobserved heterogeneity of each firm is allowed to take two different values 1ν  and 2ν . Two 
new parameters are estimated in this step, the two values for ν and the probability 1p p=  that 
a firm belongs to group 1. Then the number of different values of the unobserved 
heterogeneity ν  is expanded step-wise. The iteration continues until there are no further gains 
from expansion according to the maximum likelihood principle. The maximum likelihood 
principle of estimation is based on the idea that the sample of data at hand is more likely to 
come from a "real world" in which the parameter values are the maximum likelihood 
parameters than from a world with any other set of parameter values (Kennedy, 2008; Greene, 
2003).  
Gaure et al. (2007) has conducted an extensive Monte Carlo assessment of the non-parametric 
maximum likelihood estimator. They conclude that it is extremely reliable, provided that the 
sample size is large and that there is some exogenous variation in the hazard rates (Gaure et 
al., 2007). The method is very robust to differences in the underlying distribution of 
unobserved heterogeneity, and right-censoring of the sample data is not problematic. 
However, serious bias problems can arise if the assumption of mixed proportional hazard does 
not hold. Gaure et al. (2007) has shown that the NPMLE method will approach a distribution 
which is very close to the actual, underlying distribution of unobserved heterogeneity in the 
sample. 
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The method with discrete modelling of the unobserved heterogeneity in the sample facilitates 
a separation of the effect of firms being different from the effect of firm age. The effect of 
firms being different is captured by the differences in their unobserved heterogeneity, given 
by the different ν 's reported, and the assigned probabilities for each level of ν . The effect of 
firm age is the remaining part of the duration dependence once the heterogeneity has been 
filtered out. However, the estimated support points for the distribution of ν and their assigned 
probabilities can not be interpreted directly. Rather, they are a means to reaching estimates of 
duration dependence without noise from the selection process. 
3.3 Competing risks 
The data used in the analysis has information that allows a distinction between different types 
of exit. I will separate the firm exits along two dimensions; (1) whether or not the plant is still 
operating after the firm exits, and (2) whether the firm is bankrupt or liquidated. In order to 
investigate whether the duration dependence of different types of exit have similar profiles or 
not, I will use a transition model with two competing risks. The two hazards are dependent 
and must therefore be modelled simultaneously. When modelling two competing risks, I 
assume a piecewise constant hazard (Røed and Westlie, 2007). In other words, the hazard is 
constant within each period, so that 0 ( ) jtλ λ=  for 1 tτ τ− < <  and thus j jγ λ= . In this 
setting, I no longer need to distinguish between period and time, so I will drop the notation 
with j  for period and use t  to indicate period.  
There are two baseline hazards in the competing risks model, 1tλ and 2tλ . The competing risks 
models are also estimated with the NPMLE, modelling the unobserved heterogeneity by 
means of a discrete approximation. In the competing risk-setting, iν  becomes a vector with 
one value for each transition, 1iν  and 2iν . All parameters in the model are estimated separately 
for the two transitions. In order to simplify notation, I define an index function 
kit k it kd itw x dβ λ= +  for 1, 2k = , where itx  is a vector of observed firm characteristics and 
calendar dummies and itd is the vector of period dummies. With two possible transition, the 
probability of transition of type 1 in period t  for firm i  is
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The first parenthesis gives us the probability of exit, and the fraction is the probability that the 
exit is of type 1.  
The likelihood function for the competing risks model in the NPMLE-framework is derived in 
Røed and Westlie (2007). Let itK  be the set of feasible transitions for firm i  in period t , 
which in the model with two competing risks is limited to 1,2itK = . Let kity be an outcome 
indicator, equal to one if firm i  undergoes transition k  in period t  and zero otherwise, and let 
iY  be the complete set of outcome indicators available for firm i , in this case maximum nine 
periods per firm. The contribution to the likelihood function from an individual firm is then 
given by 
 
1
exp( )1 exp exp( )
exp( )
( )
exp exp( )
kit
it
it
kit i it
kit
k Kit
it
y
kit ki
kit ki
k K kit ki
k K
i i
y Y k K
y
kit ki
k K
ww
w
L
w
νν ν
ν
ν ∈
∈
∈
∈ ∈ ⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟−⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
∈
⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ +⎢ ⎥− − +⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟ +⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦= ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥∑⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞⎢ ⎥× − +⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦
∑ ∑∏ ∏
∑
. 
In the single risk model presented in the previous section, where 1itK = , this expression can 
be simplified to 
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4 The data set 
This chapter will begin with an identification of my sample, and the definitions of entry and 
exit on which the analysis is based. Next, I explain the source and definitions of the variables 
used as explanatory variables and controls in the analysis. 
4.1 Sample selection, entry and exit 
When defining whether a firm should be included in the sample, I have used criterions both 
regarding the availability of data, the type of firm, and its process of entry. A summary of the 
steps from the merged data set with all the firm level information to the selected sample is 
found in Table 2. 
 
Table 2 - Sample selection 
 
4.1.1 The level of analysis: Firm vs. plant 
The employment data and the demographic data can be liked by individual identification 
numbers. The employment data describes all employer-employee relationships, and covers the 
whole labour marked in Norway except for the self-employed. Each entry has variables 
identifying three different levels, the individual employee, the plant and the firm.  
Firms Firm-years
1 All observations 399885 2565420
2 Not present in 1995 215087 1031781
3 In accounts data 157366 723256
4 Ltd. firm in first year of accounts, year T 130662 629934
5 In employment data 72502 411234
6 Employment in year T 49343 268820
7 No employment before year T-1 49327 268730
8 Singleplant firm in year T 48076 240620
9 Ltd. singleplant firm first year in employment 
data (if that is year T-1) 48069 240566
10 In firm data 47972 240438
11 Registration and founding completed no earlier 
than year T-3 45460 227092
Final 
sample
Remaining sample after excluding 2005-entries 
and right-censoring no-exit firms 41122 177105
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The availability of both firm- and plant-level organizational numbers in the same register is of 
great value when I want to identify and characterize firm entry and exit. In order to clarify the 
distinction between the two levels, I will give a brief definition of the concepts as used in this 
paper. The firm is the smallest combination of judicial units to constitute an organizational 
unit producing goods and services. The word plant refers to the location of economic activity, 
regardless of industry (SSB, 2010a). A grocer’s shop, a pharmacy, a shipyard, a restaurant, a 
tailor and a news stall are all unique plants in this respect.  
The firm is the judicial owner of the plant. One firm might own more than one plant, but most 
often they stand in a one-to-one relationship, one firm owning one plant1. I will then refer to it 
as a single-plant firm. Multi-plant firms can operate in several industries and geographical 
locations simultaneously, and would therefore be difficult to characterize along these 
dimensions. This is the reason why only single plant firms will be included in my analysis of 
entrant firms.  
On the other hand, a firm may itself be part of a group of firms. Such a group will report 
consolidated accounts, in addition to the accounts of each individual firm in the group. In the 
consolidated accounts the group is accounted as one unit, so all transactions between the firms 
inside the group will be disregarded. Such consolidated accounts are distinguishable in the 
accounts data, and thus they have been excluded to avoid double recording of the same 
economic activity. Unfortunately, I can not tell which firms belong to such a group and which 
are independent, so some of the firms in my analysis might be part of a group. 
4.1.2 Limited liability firms and the obligation to report accounts 
The Norwegian accounting act (Regnskapsloven, 1998) establishes the types of firms that are 
legally obliged to keep accounts and report them to administrative registers. All firms 
organized as limited liability (Ltd.) firms, both private and public2, have such an obligation. 
The accounts data contain all the reported annual accounts of Norwegian firms from 1995 to 
2005. The availability of accounts data from limited liability firms is the reason why this 
paper will only follow Ltd. firms. The accounts are on the firm level, so the firm will be the 
unit of analysis. 
                                                 
1 95% of the firms in the employment data from 1995 to 2005 are single plant firms. 
2 Norwegian organizational forms AS and ASA, aksjeselskap and allmennaksjeselskap 
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On average for the years 1996 to 2004, the Ltd. firms comprise 95 percent of the firms in the 
accounts data, 61 percent of firms in the employment data and 56 percent of total 
employment, as calculated from the employment data. Ltd. firms made up about 55 percent of 
all firms and 52 percent of total employment in 1996, increasing to 66 percent of the firms 
and 57 percent of employment in 2004. 
Inclusion in the sample require that the firm is single plant limited liability firm at time of 
entry. If, however, the firm later changes organizational form or becomes a multi-plant firm, it 
will be right-censored from that point in time.  
4.1.3 Separating the stories of firm and plant 
When using this type of register data, it is not possible to follow the life-cycle of a firm 
directly, as the firm is only observed through its organizational number, and the 
organizational numbers attached to a firm or a plant can change from one period to the next 
for a number of different reasons. A plant's firm number may change if the firm changes its 
organizational form, say, from sole proprietorship to private limited liability company, or if 
the plant is sold to another firm. The plant number can change if the plant is moved to a new 
location. By considering data on both levels, however, it becomes possible to record a more 
detailed story than would have been possible with either firm- or plant-level data alone. I 
separate the new firms – the new organizational numbers on the firm level – into subgroups 
depending on whether the plant is also brand new or has a history in advance of the firm 
entry. If the plant is older than the firm, the characteristics of the previous firm attached to the 
plant in question is known. What was its organizational form? Was it a single plant firm? The 
same separation is done at the other end of the firm’s life-cycle. When a firm number exits 
from our register, we can check whether the plant continues or not, and, if it continues, then in 
what type of firm. For example, many firms begin as sole proprietorships and later change 
organizational form to become limited companies. They then become new firms, but we will 
obviously expect their characteristics and their hazards to be different from those of genuine 
start-ups – where the plant is also brand new. By paying attention to both levels of the firm-
plant structure, it is possible to distinguish between exits due to failure and more successful 
exits such as takeovers.  
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4.1.4 The availability of data 
Combining information from the different registers imposes restrictions on the observations 
that can be included. Only firms present in all data sources were included in the analysis. This 
implies that I only considered firms with (a) reported accounts, (b) employees and (c) 
available firm data.  
There are further difficulties related to the inconsistent availability of data in the employment 
and accounts register for each operating year of the firm. The selection of Ltd. firms only is 
motivated by their common obligation to report accounts. This legal obligation implies that 
any Ltd. firm found in the employment register should be found in the accounts data for the 
same year. This is not always the case. Most disturbingly, many firms have paid employees 
for a prolonged period before they first report accounts. Also, many firms don’t report 
accounts for their last couple of years with paid employees. The treatment of firm-years with 
no accounts or no employment will be described in the next section, when defining entry and 
exit. 
4.1.5 A restrictive definition of entry 
Defining entry requires some trade-off between the desire to obtain a large sample and 
avoiding the risk of false entries, that is, defining as new a firm which has already been in 
operation for a long period of time.  
Salvanes and Tveteras (2004) have compared rules for identifying entry and exit for a data set 
similar to this one, covering Norwegian manufacturing firms in the period 1977-1992. They 
have access to explicit identification of new plants, continuing plants, and plants that closed 
down in the years 1977-1986. The second way of identifying entry and exit is to define as 
entering a firm that appears in the date in year t without being observed in year t-1, and 
likewise, define as exiting any firm present in year t but not in year t+1. After comparing the 
two identification strategies, they find only negligible differences in the number of exit. From 
lack of explicit information on entry and exit, I will therefore use the latter procedure, 
although slightly altered to exclude some kinds of false entries. 
17 
 
I use three different data sources to define entry and exit.  
1. Reported accounts: In the sample of single plant Ltd. firms, a firm is defined as entering in 
year t if it has reported accounts in this year but not in year t-1. This implies that the first year 
of entry in the sample is 1996, observations from 1995 are used to define entry. 
2. Employment records: A new entering firm must have positive employment in the year of 
entry, that is, it must be in the employment register for year t. If I had included a firm which 
had reported accounts one year before first employment, the firm's inclusion would have been 
dependent on survival through the first year and would bias the sample. The employment 
requirement excludes the Ltd. firms that are only established to store assets or for other non-
productive purposes. Unfortunately, this also excludes some firms that might be interesting 
but that start up slowly or at a very small scale. Omitting these was judged to be better than 
including the above mentioned "empty" firms.  
If the firm had employees as early as in year t-2, it will also be excluded. As explained in the 
previous section, any Ltd. firm with employees but missing accounts data have failed to fulfil 
their legal obligation to report accounts. Some errors in dating of the observations makes one 
year of employment before first accounts (employment in year t-1) acceptable, but the 
observation from this year will be excluded from the analysis.  
3. Firm data: Lastly, I require that the founding of the firm and official registration was 
completed no earlier than in year t-3.  
Hence, firms with long lags between the time of registration, first employment and first 
accounts, will be omitted from the analysis. Excluding them reduces the likelihood of false 
entries in the analysis, but it also limits the sample of firms. Some firms will never get defined 
as entering according to the above definition. 
When running the regression I will use dummies to distinguishing five different transitions at 
time of entry. The most common transition is the full entry, where the plant enters at the same 
time as the firm. The remaining four dummies describe the opposite cases, when the plant had 
a history before firm entry. Each of the four dummies represent different characteristics of the 
firm which the plant previously belonged to, grouped according to whether or not it was a 
Ltd. firm and whether it was a single-plant or a multi-plant firm. 
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4.1.6 Defining and characterizing exit 
Several sources of information contribute to the definition and characterization of firm exit. 
Observations of the firm's last year of reported accounts and the last year of employment is 
supplemented with the firm data, which includes dummy variables with information from 
2007 on whether the firm is still active or deleted and whether it has entered a bankruptcy 
process or not. 
After excluding the firms with several years of employment before the first reported accounts 
through the definition of entry, many firm-years remain that lack reported accounts in the 
other end of their life-cycle. When considering all observations after entry for the firms in the 
sample, there are 7272 firm-years with employment but no accounts, constituting 3.4% of the 
observation-years in the sample. All of these years are after the last reported accounts, and 
firms that end in bankruptcy are responsible for 83% of these firm-years with missing 
accounts. It seems that firms undergoing a bankruptcy process do not give priority to 
reporting the usual annual accounts, they rather spend their resources elsewhere. Only one 
third of the firms who go bankrupt report accounts for the last year of employment, compared 
to 97% for the rest of the exiting firms. The data suggests that the firm has usually already 
entered the bankruptcy process, or is speeding rapidly towards it, if it has employment but do 
not report accounts. Because it appears that not reporting accounts is a clear sign of imminent 
final exit, I disregard the employment which take place after the last year of accounts. The 
firm is defined as exiting in year t if it has reported accounts for year t but not for year t+1. 
The last year of exit is 2004, firms who are still present in the accounts data in 2005 have 
unknown outcome, and is right-censored after 2004. 
There are also many cases where employment ceases well before the firm is formally closed 
down and deleted, and there can be years of apparent non-activity, in which the firm has a 
temporary halt in employment. Continuous employment until exit is not required and the 
employment level after the first year will not be considered in the analysis.  
The data allows for a separation of different types of firm exit in two respects. First, as 
explained in section 4.1.3, it is possible to distinguish between the exits where the plant 
continues under another firm and simultaneous exit of firm and plant. Second, the firm data 
has information on bankruptcies, which makes it possible to separate bankruptcies from other 
firm exits. Non-bankrupt exits will be referred to as liquidations. 
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4.1.7 Summing up entry and exit 
In total, there are 41 122 unique firms in the sample, with 177 105 observation years 
altogether. 12 235 firms are defined as exiting, constituting nearly 30% of the firms we 
follow. The average exit rate is 6.9% per firm year. 
Through the above definitions, the birth and death of the firm follows the firm's presence in 
the accounts data. Thus, all of the firm-years with missing accounts are excluded. This 
increases the reliability of our definition of entry. Observing that none of the firms in the 
sample has an intermediate year where accounts are not reported, it is quite unlikely that any 
of the firms defined as entering actually did exist before 1995.  
The information in the firm data confirms that nearly 99 percent of the defined exits are 
indeed listed as bankrupt or otherwise deleted by 2007. Of the remaining 166 unconfirmed 
exits, there are only nine exits before 2003. The lack of data in the last two years indicates 
that there are some lags before registration rather than extensive false exits. 
The data covers the years 1995-2005. The first and last years are used for identifying entry 
and exit, so they can not be included in the analysis. Any firm present in the accounts data or 
employment data in 1995 will be excluded, so the first observed entry of firms is in 1996. 
Any firm still in the accounts data in 2005 is a no-exit firm, while a firm present in 2004 but 
not in 2005 is defined as exiting in 2004. That leaves me with a maximum of nine 
observation-years per firm. There are more observations for the early years of a firm's life-
cycle than for later years, because the firms entering late in the period 1996-2004 will be 
observed for a shorter period of time. 
The definitions of entry and exit have some impact on the resulting estimates of the exit 
hazard's duration dependence. Defining the first year in any data set as entry, or the last year 
in any set as exit, would stretch the hazard curve horizontally, but it is not likely that it would 
significantly alter its general shape. Excluding all firms who never report accounts, on the 
other hand, could influence my analysis. Some firms exit before they even get as far as to 
report their first annual account. There are about 3000 single plant Ltd. firms that are 
observed with employees for a few years but never report accounts, 67 percent of these last 
for only one year and 94 percent exit before their third year. Their absence in my selection of 
firms will cause the exit rate for the firms in my sample to be lower than the true exit rate for 
the population of Ltd. firms. These 3000 firms should not be compared to the sample size of 
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about 41 000 firms. Rather, they must be compared to the extended groups of firm which 
would have included all the other firms I have excluded because of poor information. In sum, 
it must be recognized that the selection criterions above sets a lower limit to the quality of 
firms included. In order to be included in the analysis, a firm must fulfil some minimum 
requirements, most notably inclusion in all the relevant registers and reporting accounts from 
the start, which in and of itself are good signals.  
4.2 Variables 
The analysis takes a snapshot of the firm in its year of entry, and uses these "first year 
characteristics" to explain later survival and exit risks. By only using information from the 
firm's first year I ensure that the explanatory variables used are exogenous or at least 
predetermined to the exit decision. The only time-varying explanatory variable will therefore 
be the firm age and calendar year dummy variables. Other variables characterize the firm, its 
industry and its employees in the year of entry. 
4.2.1 Firm characteristics 
I want to control for the heterogeneity of firm which is caused by industry, geographical 
location and listing on the stock exchange. The cross-section data set on the firms is my 
preferred source of information on these characteristics. If missing here, I check to 
employment and accounts data. The firms' county is my control for location3.  
For industry controls I use a two-digit NACE code. I further group the industries into sectors 
according to the same standard of industry classification (Eurostat 1996; SSB 2010a). The 
sector variable was used instead of industry in a simplified regression.  
The organizational form of firms is available from both employment, accounts and firm data. 
For the purpose of the sample selection described earlier, all I need to know is whether or not 
a firm is organized as a Ltd. firm, that is, either a private or a public limited company. There 
are few discrepancies between the organizational type reported in the different sources. In the 
regressions, I also use a dummy distinguishing between private and public limited firms.  
4.2.2 Employment and characteristics of the employees 
                                                 
3 Norwegian county: Fylke 
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The employment level in the firm's first year is our main indicator for firm size, and we use 
the characteristics of the employees to say something about the type of labour input used and 
the technology of the firm. The labour input will also be used in the computations of labour 
productivity. 
When assessing the labour input of each firm, I begin with the start- and end- date of each 
individual employment-relationship to compute the duration of the employment as a fraction 
of the calendar year. This is the gross employment per individual employee ( ijG ). Second, 
gross employment is adjusted by the reported expected hours worked per week ( ija ), to get 
the contribution to net employment from the individual ( ijE ). Summing all individuals in firm 
i , I get a measure of the year's total employment ( iE ).  
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where j  is the individual, i  is the firm, ED is end date of employment and SD is start date of 
employment4. Different values have been tried for the fraction of a full time equivalent 
worked by part-time workers ( ija ), I use the fractions (1, 2/3, 1/3) for full time, reduced time 
and part-time, respectively. When I aggregate employment over all firms in the employment 
register, I get approximately 1.69 million man-labour years for year 2000. This amounts to 93 
percent of the 1.83 million man-labour years reported by Statistics Norway (SSB, 2010c).  
I want to construct a measure for yearly labour input ( *iE ) based on the above employment 
measure. The firm might not be in operation for the whole duration of the calendar year, 
particularly not in the first and last year of operation. I want to be able to compare the size of 
different firms in their first year by the scale of labour input, even if one firm starts in January 
and another in August. For this purpose I divide the above employment measure by the 
fraction ( iF ) of the year in which the firm had employees.  
 max( ) min( ) / 365i ij ijF ED SD⎡ ⎤= −⎣ ⎦  
                                                 
4 There are a lot of missing values for start- and end-dates, particularly in the early years of the period. The 
missing values normally means that the employment started before the current year or continues after the end of 
the year. Therefore, when a start-date is missing, I set it to January 1st, and when an end-date is missing it is set 
to December 31st.  
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For example, if the first employee started at July 1st, I will divide by one half, so the labour 
measure is doubled. I then get the yearly equivalent - how much employment there would 
have been if the same employment level was expanded to last for a whole year, *iE . 
 * ( / )i i iE E F=  
This is the employment measure used in the analysis. I split the size of employment in five 
dummies. Most of the firms in the sample are small in terms of employment in the first year, 
the median firm has 2.7 man-labour years. Only 17% of the firms have more than five man-
labour years of employment according to this definition, and they pull up the average to 5.4 
man-labour years.  
In addition to the use of employment per se as an explanatory variable, I need a labour input 
measure for the calculation of labour productivity. For this purpose, it would be 
counterintuitive to use yearly equivalents. If employment lasted for a few months only, then 
the accounting values are also corresponding to the activity in a period of less than one year. 
But I want to make another adjustment from the net firm employment iE . Many Ltd. firms 
has some labour input from non-employees. There are often owners who get income from 
self-employment rather than labour-wages as compensation for their efforts. I will assume one 
man-labour year extra labour input for each firm from non-employees. Through this step, I 
avoid the very low employment levels otherwise reported for many firms, which in the labour 
productivity measure would lead to apparent very high productivity if left uncorrected. iL  is 
the labour input measure used in the later computation of labour productivity. Thus 
1i iL E= + . 
When aggregating demographic characteristics of the employees on the firm level, namely the 
age, education and sex, I weight the contribution from each employee by their respective 
fractions of the firm's total employment. The variables describing the mean age and education 
of employees and the share of female employees are grouped in dummies, and each have a 
separate dummy for missing values. I also include a separate dummy for the reported sex of 
the firm's CEO. There are many missing values for this variable, but as I have found that the 
presence of missing information has some explanatory power I choose to include it anyhow. 
4.2.3 Labour productivity and debt 
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The labour productivity of the firm in its first year is a proxy for initial quality and can tell us 
something about the prospects for future profitability. The productivity measure used here is 
based on the gross value generated per unit of labour in the firm. I compute it as profit plus 
wages, divided by labour input. The valuation and cost of capital and the resulting definition 
of profits used here will be discussed after a passage on the implications of the financial year. 
The financial year 
Revenue, expenses and wages are all monetary values obtained from the accounts data. 
Labour input is computed on the basis of yearly employment data. Before combining the two 
sources in a productivity measure, it is important to bear in mind that the financial year can 
deviate from the calendar year in two ways. Its duration is not always twelve months, and it 
may not start and end at the turn of the year. On the one hand, the duration of a financial year 
can be up to eighteen months. If a firm starts operating after July 1st, it is customary to include 
the transactions for the first half year in the accounts for the following calendar year. If it 
starts June 30th or earlier, it must hand in a separate accounts for the first calendar year 
according to the eighteen months limit. On the other hand, for some firms it might be more 
appropriate to separate the years at a different time than at new year. For example, a ski resort 
will prefer to have the whole winter season united in one accounts, and use the slow summer 
months rather than early spring to prepare the annual accounts. The firm can then use for 
example May 1st to April 30th as its standard financial year.  
These deviations between financial and calendar years make it more troublesome to link the 
accounts data to the employment data. In order to reduce this problem, I split each entry 
according to calendar years and allocate the respective fractions of each entry into the right 
calendar year. All the accounts have variables for the start- and end-dates of its financial year, 
except for the years 1995 to 1997 when the start-dates are missing. As a point of departure, 
the start-dates for these years is set to January 1st. The dates are then adjusted to some extent 
by general rules based on the end-date of each financial year and the start- and end-dates of 
employment. Next, I adjust the cases where the same six months has been included in the 
accounts of two successive financial years, and the cases where there are months that appear 
to be missing in the accounts. Finally, I use these corrected dates to divide and allocate the 
entry values of all accounts as described above. The end result is that whenever there are 
discrepancies between financial and calendar year, the firm's accounts for one calendar year 
will be a weighted average of the accounts for two or three successive financial years.  
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The valuation of capital 
From the accounts data, I get nominal values of sales revenues, wage costs, material costs and 
other costs as well as provisions for the write-down and depreciation of capital5. I want to 
compute a productivity measure, preferably a labour productivity measure calculated as the 
operating income less the cost of capital and other non-labour input, divided by labour input. 
The cost and size of the capital input is by far the most difficult one to assess on the basis of 
accounts information. The valuation of a plant’s capital stock in the annual accounts is not as 
straightforward as one might hope for. The capital values listed in the firms’ accounts are 
blurred by a substantial degree of subjectivity in the process of writing off and depreciating 
capital.  
According to the Norwegian Accounting Act (Regnskapsloven, 1998), the book-keeping 
value of capital is computed as the purchase expenses at the date of acquisition adjusted by 
some depreciation. According to the International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS), book-
keeping value of capital should equal the expected present market value. Public limited 
companies in Norway must follow the principles in IFRS, and also those who are planning to 
go public or for other reasons find it more convenient or appropriate to follow IFRS may 
choose to do so. Those are the exceptions, the vast majority of private limited firms follow the 
Norwegian principles. Under the Norwegian system, old capital stocks are systematically 
undervalued compared to new capital stocks. On average this implies an undervaluation of the 
capital of old firms compared to new firms, if we assume that the age of capital is related to 
the age of the firm.  
This bias is also present in the cost accounts, where the provisions for writing off and 
depreciation of capital are included to represent the annual cost of capital input. The choice of 
how to write-off capital is to a large extent a subjective choice of the firm. Another factor 
worthy of mentioning is that some firms choose to rent their capital equipment rather than buy 
and own it. If so, their cost of capital is located under the provision other costs in the 
accounts, as opposed to under the provisions for writing off and depreciation where it would 
be located had the firm owned its own capital. 
Because of the imprecise nature of the different capital measures, I tested two different 
measures of productivity in the regression. One included capital costs and one excluded it, the 
                                                 
5 The correct accounting expression would be the write-down and depreciation of tangible and intangible fixed 
assets. I use the term capital, as it is more commonly used in the field of economics. 
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latter case disregarding both the writing off and depreciation of capital and other costs. The 
first one, with capital cost, was found to give the model larger explanatory power. Because I 
only use productivity in the first operating year as an explanatory variable in the analysis, the 
bias from the age of capital is not likely to be important here. Neither is there an apparent 
reason to believe that the subjectivity and thus differences in the entries for capital costs 
should be systematically biased in any particular direction. Besides, leaving out the capital 
cost altogether deprives the analysis of some information. I have therefore used the full 
productivity measure with capital costs in the estimations reported in this paper. The 
operating result equals sales income and other income less wages, material costs, other costs 
and the depreciation and appreciation of capital. Productivity is defined here as operating 
result plus wages, divided by employment plus one. All nominal values in the accounts are 
transformed to real values using CPI (SSB, 2010b) before the productivity is computed. I 
group the labour productivity variable into ten dummies, one for each decile of the 
distribution. 
Debt 
There is a close relationship between bankruptcy and debt. Unsettled claims from creditors is 
the triggering factor for a bankruptcy petition. The ratio of debt to equity is available directly 
from the accounts data, and is an indicator of the financial solvency of the firm. A high debt-
to-equity ratio means that the firm is highly leveraged, so the debt burden is large. A negative 
value of the debt-to-equity ratio can only occur if the value of equity is negative. Negative 
equity is regarded as a sign of very high risk of bankruptcy. Because it is a ratio, it can not be 
split according to calendar years in the same way as the monetary values. Instead, I use the 
ratio from the firms' first reported accounts. The debt ratios are grouped in nine dummies, and 
the two first dummies represent negative values of debt-to-equity.  
4.3 Estimation procedure 
The final data set contains one observation per firm year. Each observation includes the firm 
identification number, firm age, calendar year, dummies identifying exit and all the above 
mentioned variables describing the first year of the firm.  
The first three models represent three different ways to handle the unobserved differences 
between firms. Model 1 disregards the unobserved differences. Model 2 imposes a gamma-
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distributed random covariate to represent the firm-specific unobserved quality parameter iν . 
Model 3 uses the method with non-parametric maximum likelihood estimators, which 
approximates a discrete distribution of iν .  
Model 4 to 6 are extensions of model 3. Model 4 is a single-risk model like model 3, but with 
a larger set of covariates. Model 5 and 6 are models with two competing risk. Model 5 
separates between the risk of "full exit" and the risk of "half exit", while model 6 separates 
between bankruptcies and liquidation. 
In order to estimate model 2, I use a Stata-program developed by Stephen P. Jenkins and 
presented in Jenkins (1997). This program estimates a clog-log model with and without added 
Gamma-distributed unobserved heterogeneity. 
When estimating the NPMLE-models, models 3 to 6, I use a programme developed at the 
Frisch Centre. It is written in R programming language, and was designed specifically for the 
purpose of finding a manageable and computable means to handle the unobserved 
heterogeneity with a discrete approximation. This is the method which is thoroughly 
explained and tested in Gaure et al. (2007), and used for example in Røed and Westlie (2007).  
The reference model disregarding the unobserved heterogeneity altogether, model 1, has been 
estimated both in R and in Stata. In R, this corresponds to the case where the discrete 
distribution of unobserved heterogeneity has only one support point. In Stata, this is the 
reported basic model before the assumption of Gamma-distributed unobserved heterogeneity 
is added. The two methods should be identical, and they do indeed produce identical results.  
Stata works more slowly than R, and runs into difficulties when the number of parameters 
gets very large. In the end I landed on a slightly simplified model for the estimation of model 
2 in Stata. For comparability, models 1 and 3 include the same set of covariates. This 
simplified set of covariates include sector to control for industry, and have no indicator for 
geographical location. The full set, used in models 4 to 6, use the two-digit NACE codes for 
industry controls, and include the dummies for county. 
When estimating the NPMLE-models, I get estimates for each iteration of the model, until the 
likelihood is no longer improved by including more mass points in the estimated distribution 
of unobserved firm characteristics iν . After the maximum likelihood estimation is completed, 
I choose the iteration with the lowest reported value for AIC. AIC is the Akaike Information 
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Criterion, a measure of model fit. When modelling probabilities, we get no residuals and 
hence no 2R  on which to base a measure of model fit. The AIC used is therefore a function of 
the log-likelihood function, with a penalty for the number of parameters included. AIC 
improves (gets smaller) as the likelihood function increases and degrades (gets larger) as the 
model size increases. The best iterations in these models were the ones with four mass points 
in model 3 to 5, and six mass points in model 6. 
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5 The estimation results 
This chapter will begin with a brief guide to how the estimation results from the duration 
models can be understood. I start out by looking at the three single risk models with different 
assumptions on heterogeneity. Next, I turn to models of competing risks. First is a model 
separating between what I have called full and half exit, where half exit is the label for firms 
exits where the plant continues under a new firm. The second competing risks model separate 
between bankruptcies and liquidation, where liquidation includes all non-bankrupt exits. The 
coefficients estimated for the observed differences between firms will be discussed after the 
various models and their respective baseline hazards. At last, I give a numerical example 
which combines selection effects and duration dependence to produce an average exit hazard.  
5.1 Interpreting the results 
Tables 3, 5 and 6 report the estimation results. The estimated coefficients β  and their 
standard errors are reported. To interpret the estimates, note that exp( )β  expresses the 
proportional change in the continuous time exit hazard of a firm with this value of the 
covariate, relative to one similar in all other respects but with the reference value for this 
covariate. 
 The reference firm is a construct, defined as the firm for which all the reference dummies are 
equal to one. In our case, it is a firm that started in Oslo in 1996 with 1-2 employees whose 
mean age was 30-36 years, with a female share below 40%, productivity near the median etc. 
All the coefficients for the reference dummies are normalized to one. This means that a 
dummy variable with coefficient such that exp( ) 1.15iβ =  is associated with approximately 
15% larger exit hazard than the reference firm, while one with exp( ) 0.70iβ =  corresponds to 
30% less than the reference. 
 
The asterisks in the columns "sign. β " indicate whether the estimated coefficient for β  is 
significantly different from 0, or, in other words, whether the implied exp( )β  is significantly 
different from 1. If [ ]0 1.96 ( )SEβ β∉ ± ⋅ , then two asterisks are reported, indicating that the 
coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 5% level. Estimates that are significant at 
the 1% level are marked with three asterisks, at the 5% level with two asterisks, and finally, 
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estimates that are significant at the 10% level is marked with one asterisk. The estimated 
coefficients for sector, NACE and county are found in the appendix to this paper. 
The estimated intercepts in the different models will not be a focus of this discussion. They 
represent the expected hazard for the reference firm in the third year, and the reference firm is 
not an easily interpreted concept. There are no observations of firms that satisfy all the 
reference dummies. Nor is the reference firm an average firm. Furthermore, the discrete 
approximation of the unobserved quality parameters of the sample firms is very crude, and the 
point estimates are not reliable. The discussion will instead focus on the direction of 
proportional increases or decreases in the hazard rate for firms with different covariates than 
the reference firm.  
5.2 Different assumptions on heterogeneity 
This section will start with a closer look at the observed exit hazard of firms in the sample. I 
proceed to a model which controls for the observed heterogeneity of firms (model 1). Finally, 
I present two models which attempt to filter out the selection effect from the duration 
dependence by explicitly modelling the unobserved heterogeneity. One model assumes a 
Gamma-distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity (model 2), the other searches for a 
discrete distribution (model 3).  
The observed gross exit rate in the sample is shown in Figure 1. After a peak of nearly 8% 
firm exits per year in the third year, the exit hazard declines to about 4% in year nine. As 
explained in section 4.1.7, the sample probably has a surprisingly low exit rate for firms aged 
one to two years, partly because only firms that report accounts for at least one year are 
included in the sample. I will therefore not emphasize the hazard rates for year one and two in 
the discussion of estimation results, and instead use the third year as the reference year. 
Nevertheless, it remains an empirical fact that the gross exit hazard for the firms in this 
sample is increasing until year three. There may be other explanations than sample selection. 
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Variable dummy β std. β sign. β  β std. β sign. β  β std. β sign. β 
age 1 -0.22800 0.03112 *** -0.71351 0.04727 *** -0.81233 0.06009 ***
age 2 -0.02647 0.02980 -0.25707 0.03432 *** -0.30321 0.03740 ***
age 3 (R)
age 4 -0.04536 0.03301 0.15618 0.03644 *** 0.19544 0.03838 ***
age 5 -0.05615 0.03621 0.33094 0.04645 *** 0.40252 0.05003 ***
age 6 -0.07665 0.04125 * 0.48228 0.05903 *** 0.57632 0.06335 ***
age 7 -0.09688 0.04800 ** 0.63465 0.07339 *** 0.73876 0.07702 ***
age 8 -0.11703 0.06394 * 0.79099 0.09484 *** 0.89150 0.09556 ***
age 9 -0.17791 0.10843 0.91526 0.13931 *** 0.99973 0.13671 ***
new plant (R)
old plant -0.19162 0.04569 *** -0.31555 0.06456 *** -0.33250 0.06826 ***
old pl, non-Ltd. -0.47970 0.04150 *** -0.73606 0.05836 *** -0.78060 0.06257 ***
old pl, multi-pl -0.29459 0.10172 *** -0.46482 0.13515 *** -0.49871 0.14428 ***
old pl, non-Ltd. Mult -0.15278 0.19492 -0.17465 0.27212 -0.18348 0.28969
1996 -0.24507 0.06991 *** -0.23987 0.07458 *** -0.23810 0.07569 ***
1997 -0.12556 0.04837 *** -0.13935 0.05035 *** -0.14303 0.05079 ***
1998 (R)
1999 0.03908 0.03975 0.06870 0.04120 * 0.07337 0.04150 *
2000 0.19858 0.03854 *** 0.26334 0.04166 *** 0.27111 0.04255 ***
2001 0.11782 0.03958 *** 0.20526 0.04416 *** 0.21474 0.04544 ***
2002 0.19103 0.03931 *** 0.29605 0.04570 *** 0.30763 0.04751 ***
2003 0.01555 0.04095 0.11896 0.04877 ** 0.13025 0.05085 **
2004 -0.47809 0.04574 *** -0.42510 0.05391 *** -0.41922 0.05676 ***
1st decile 0.31804 0.03943 *** 0.49092 0.06254 *** 0.53144 0.06477 ***
2nd decile 0.32745 0.03807 *** 0.47720 0.05935 *** 0.49296 0.06327 ***
3rd decile 0.14881 0.03852 *** 0.21998 0.05865 *** 0.23153 0.06172 ***
4th decile 0.10378 0.03876 *** 0.12705 0.05863 ** 0.14621 0.06153 **
5th decile (R)
6th decile -0.08310 0.04105 ** -0.13916 0.06023 ** -0.14367 0.06280 **
7th decile -0.19276 0.04313 *** -0.30693 0.06241 *** -0.31994 0.06553 ***
8th decile -0.29806 0.04613 *** -0.42259 0.06527 *** -0.43501 0.06787 ***
9th decile -0.21782 0.04612 *** -0.32731 0.06541 *** -0.34193 0.06897 ***
10th decile -0.20386 0.04709 *** -0.31764 0.06698 *** -0.33814 0.07135 ***
< -, -5] 0.38585 0.03534 *** 0.76277 0.05948 *** 0.81581 0.05985 ***
<-5, 0] 0.62840 0.03695 *** 1.14657 0.06569 *** 1.21544 0.06811 ***
<0, 0.5] 0.00893 0.05276 0.01979 0.07574 0.02420 0.08202
<0.5, 1] -0.00536 0.05002 0.01371 0.07034 0.01478 0.07588
<1, 2.5] (R)
<2.5, 5] -0.03085 0.03418 -0.02064 0.04793 -0.01696 0.05170
<5, 10] -0.06878 0.03478 ** -0.06410 0.04859 -0.06404 0.05225
<10, 100] 0.15815 0.03490 *** 0.27790 0.05147 *** 0.30572 0.05496 ***
<100, +] 0.24138 0.08479 *** 0.40719 0.12947 *** 0.44930 0.13703 ***
missing 0.37775 0.12486 *** 0.81549 0.20966 *** 0.85379 0.20584 ***
<0, 1] -0.04291 0.02584 * -0.05495 0.03901 -0.06289 0.04165
<1, 2] (R)
<2, 3] -0.03202 0.02964 -0.01123 0.04460 -0.02008 0.04655
<3, 5] -0.02185 0.03059 0.00580 0.04605 0.00562 0.04754
<5, +] -0.00193 0.03225 0.02436 0.04784 0.01783 0.04928
<-, 30> 0.11287 0.02456 *** 0.18978 0.03826 *** 0.19547 0.03975 ***
[30, 36> (R)
[36, 42> -0.09302 0.02628 *** -0.16936 0.03925 *** -0.18345 0.04136 ***
[42, +> -0.19315 0.02705 *** -0.31935 0.04064 *** -0.33502 0.04287 ***
missing 0.26258 0.21471 0.63938 0.34267 * 0.61699 0.32870 *
<-, 10> 0.07167 0.03606 ** 0.14747 0.05799 ** 0.13776 0.05989 **
[10, 12> (R)
[12, 14> -0.09791 0.02203 *** -0.16908 0.03349 *** -0.17672 0.03511 ***
[14, +] -0.24542 0.03275 *** -0.35978 0.04794 *** -0.38381 0.05110 ***
missing -0.02737 0.06595 -0.03582 0.10228 -0.03759 0.10619
[0, 0.4] (R)
<0.4, 0.6> -0.02547 0.03261 -0.04429 0.04953 -0.04848 0.05152
[0.6, 1] -0.02249 0.02553 -0.06189 0.03937 -0.06053 0.04145
missing 0.05043 0.15283 0.13520 0.24038 0.16160 0.24871
male (R)
female  -0.00057 0.03215 0.03983 0.04830 0.04982 0.04987
missing 0.34158 0.02154 *** 0.48960 0.03464 *** 0.52161 0.03840 ***
private (R)
public  -0.13110 0.17534  -0.17090 0.26223  -0.19355 0.26676  
Log-likelihood
Parameters
Mass points
Age of employees
Education of 
employees
Female share of 
employees
Sex of CEO
Public vs private 
Ltd.
Firm age
Entry type
Year
Labour 
productivity
Debt-to-equity
Employment
1 - 4
Basic Gamma Discrete
Model 3
-42428.0257 -42262.476 -42246.6094
74 75 80
Model 1 Model 2
Table 3 - Estimation results for models 1, 2 and 3 
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For example, it might be that many entrepreneurs decide to “dig in” and keep the business 
running for at least a couple of years before they cave in, even if they are losing money. 
Having gone through the efforts of establishing a new firm, they might want to "give it a real 
try". 
Controlling for unobserved heterogeneity in the regression is an attempt to separate the effect 
of duration from the effect of type. I compare three different model specifications. Model 1 
disregards the unobserved heterogeneity and estimates the gross effect of age. This model, 
therefore, combines selection effects and duration effects. If there were no unobserved 
heterogeneity there would be no remaining selection effect once the observed characteristics 
were controlled for, and model 1 would be sufficient. Model 2 assumes that the unobserved 
heterogeneity is Gamma-distributed. The mean of the distribution is set to one, and the 
regression gives an estimate of the variance. This estimate provides an indication of the role 
played by unobserved heterogeneity in the data. Model 3 estimates a discrete distribution of 
the unobserved heterogeneity as explained in chapter 3.2. The estimation results of these three 
regressions are shown in Table 3. 
As we can see in Figure 2b, model 1 has no significant effects of age after year three. If 
anything the tendency is towards a slightly decreasing hazard. Compared to the observed 
gross exit rate shown in Figure 1, this basic model removes the part of the selection effect that 
stems from observed differences between firms. The remainder of the selection effect, the one 
caused by quality difference we have not been able to observe and include as covariates in the 
model, remains. 
After controlling for observed heterogeneity in model 1, the selection effect was clearly 
reduced compared to the effect in the observed exit hazard. Though the selection effect must 
still be assumed to be significant, it is no longer strong enough to create a downward sloping 
hazard function.  
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Figure 2 -
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
3 1 exp( exp( ))h ν= − − , and th  is given by 1 exp( exp( ))t th λ ν= − − + . Figure 2b-d include a 
95% confidence interval for the estimated duration dependence. 
From Table 3, we see that the calendar year affect is remarkably unaffected by the inclusion 
of ν  in models 2 and 3 compared to model 1. The remainder of the explanatory variables in 
the models differ only in terms of scale between the different models. Note that the 
employment level in the year of entry is not significant in these models. Firms that start up 
with older, more educated employees have a lower exit hazard, and so do firms that start up 
with an old plant. A further discussion of the significance of observed differences between 
firms will follow in chapter 5.4. 
5.3 Competing risks 
All the firm exits in the sample are categorized as either full or half exit, and as either 
bankruptcy or liquidation, in total four different possible combinations. For example, 4% of 
the exits are bankrupt firms whose plant continues under a new firm. Table 4 reports the total 
frequencies of different types of exit. The first competing risks model (model 5) separates the 
14% "half exits", in which the plant continues after firm exit, form the "full exits". The second 
competing risks model (model 6) separates the 49% bankruptcies from the remaining firm 
exits.  
 
Table 4 - Four different types of exit  
The motivation for splitting the exits in different groups is that the observed duration 
dependencies are quite different for the different types of exit. As we have seen, the observed 
exit rate is decreasing with firm age after year three. Figure 3a shows a decomposition of the 
gross exit rate into full and half exits. The hazard of half exit, that is, plant continuation, is 
increasing with age even before I correct for the selection effect. Figure 3b shows a similar 
decomposition, now separating bankruptcies from liquidation. The observed risk of 
Type of exit Bankruptcy Liquidation Total
5519 4984 10503
45% 41% 86%
536 1196 1732
4% 10% 14%
Total 6055 6180 12235
49% 51% 100%
Full exit
Half exit 
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Table 5 - Estimation results for models 4 and 5 
  
Log-likelihood
Parameters
Mass points
Variable dummy β SE(β) sign. β  β SE(β) sign. β  β SE(β) sign. β 
age 1 -0.81901 0.05901 *** -0.79866 0.06080 *** -1.35044 0.13682 ***
age 2 -0.30242 0.03710 *** -0.29301 0.03924 *** -0.51695 0.09567 ***
age 3 (R)
age 4 0.19017 0.03811 *** 0.19804 0.04120 *** 0.26824 0.09385 ***
age 5 0.38973 0.04931 *** 0.41641 0.05257 *** 0.46668 0.11818 ***
age 6 0.55597 0.06217 *** 0.61728 0.06608 *** 0.51689 0.14610 ***
age 7 0.71020 0.07495 *** 0.76276 0.08008 *** 0.79361 0.17090 ***
age 8 0.85502 0.09327 *** 0.80628 0.10194 *** 1.35331 0.19815 ***
age 9 0.95815 0.13478 *** 0.98699 0.14847 *** 1.23841 0.29254 ***
new plant (R)
old plant -0.34226 0.06840 *** -0.56062 0.07725 *** 0.17206 0.10132 *
old pl, non-Ltd. -0.77448 0.06286 *** -0.91304 0.06866 *** -0.29478 0.11031 ***
old pl, multi-pl -0.54911 0.14506 *** -0.90647 0.17884 *** 0.03685 0.19731
old pl, non-Ltd. Multipl -0.30135 0.29482 -0.56847 0.33917 * 0.07265 0.43099
1996 -0.27211 0.07712 *** -0.26219 0.07948 *** -0.77653 0.34424 **
1997 -0.15092 0.05106 *** -0.14376 0.05326 *** -0.35175 0.18791 *
1998 (R)
1999 0.07886 0.04169 * 0.04926 0.04436 0.37019 0.12493 ***
2000 0.28046 0.04282 *** 0.25322 0.04548 *** 0.58348 0.12404 ***
2001 0.22762 0.04570 *** 0.19172 0.04855 *** 0.58354 0.12645 ***
2002 0.32369 0.04776 *** 0.31104 0.05053 *** 0.56115 0.13086 ***
2003 0.14769 0.05111 *** 0.13122 0.05427 ** 0.42069 0.13406 ***
2004 -0.39917 0.05693 *** -0.47126 0.06127 *** 0.08107 0.14136
1st decile 0.53813 0.06474 *** 0.56273 0.06849 *** 0.56824 0.12841 ***
2nd decile 0.49110 0.06297 *** 0.55324 0.06669 *** 0.24894 0.12451 **
3rd decile 0.21992 0.06141 *** 0.26903 0.06532 *** -0.05752 0.12010
4th decile 0.14419 0.06114 ** 0.13582 0.06494 ** 0.23314 0.11453 **
5th decile (R)
6th decile -0.13804 0.06248 ** -0.13208 0.06625 ** -0.18528 0.12366
7th decile -0.31175 0.06535 *** -0.32312 0.06959 *** -0.30052 0.12625 **
8th decile -0.42569 0.06778 *** -0.43113 0.07244 *** -0.36708 0.13474 ***
9th decile -0.32570 0.06920 *** -0.34498 0.07367 *** -0.15801 0.14102
10th decile -0.31379 0.07186 *** -0.35818 0.07708 *** 0.11006 0.14286
< -, -5] 0.81810 0.05950 *** 0.83553 0.06277 *** 1.05764 0.13292 ***
<-5, 0] 1.20116 0.06733 *** 1.25874 0.07114 *** 1.20844 0.15075 ***
<0, 0.5] 0.05622 0.08224 0.01831 0.08701 0.46961 0.20457 **
<0.5, 1] 0.01609 0.07603 -0.00416 0.08011 0.21472 0.19723
<1, 2.5] (R)
<2.5, 5] -0.01896 0.05180 -0.02395 0.05457 0.12646 0.12380
<5, 10] -0.05842 0.05233 -0.10913 0.05565 ** 0.33755 0.11773 ***
<10, 100] 0.31733 0.05494 *** 0.28159 0.05819 *** 0.70153 0.11965 ***
<100, +] 0.48186 0.13711 *** 0.42397 0.14875 *** 0.96387 0.23263 ***
missing 0.83025 0.20891 *** 0.85071 0.21942 *** 1.25893 0.38293 ***
<0, 1] -0.02912 0.04169 -0.02088 0.04373 -0.41210 0.10808 ***
<1, 2] (R)
<2, 3] -0.03444 0.04655 -0.07144 0.04909 0.28599 0.09762 ***
<3, 5] -0.01493 0.04763 -0.09938 0.05096 * 0.53317 0.09380 ***
<5, +] 0.01120 0.04941 -0.23000 0.05412 *** 1.00967 0.09420 ***
<-, 30> 0.17167 0.03958 *** 0.16849 0.04201 *** 0.20121 0.07598 ***
[30, 36> (R)
[36, 42> -0.17427 0.04143 *** -0.19429 0.04423 *** -0.10571 0.08328
[42, +> -0.30873 0.04298 *** -0.30680 0.04550 *** -0.44657 0.09631 ***
missing 0.75192 0.32626 ** 0.82239 0.34413 ** -0.62526 1.18921
<-, 10> 0.10996 0.05999 * 0.11290 0.06373 * 0.14000 0.11868
[10, 12> (R)
[12, 14> -0.18293 0.03537 *** -0.21218 0.03772 *** -0.03105 0.07025
[14, +] -0.44410 0.05223 *** -0.47867 0.05542 *** -0.23648 0.12409 *
missing -0.09722 0.10673 -0.10205 0.11182 -0.08770 0.29859
[0, 0.4] (R)
<0.4, 0.6> -0.08489 0.05211 -0.15226 0.05610 *** 0.19600 0.09184 **
[0.6, 1] -0.13596 0.04319 *** -0.23454 0.04638 *** 0.28815 0.07982 ***
missing 0.12847 0.24689 0.11682 0.25991 0.59811 0.56732
male (R)
female  0.01298 0.04996 0.05904 0.05379 -0.08189 0.08863
missing 0.51237 0.03808 *** 0.54040 0.04030 *** 0.41934 0.07675 ***
private (R)
public  -0.32130 0.27599  -0.29652 0.29102  0.01608 0.80543
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5.3.1 Full exit vs. half exit 
Not all exits are failures. Some firms exit even thought they are profitable. What I have 
labelled a "half exit" is defined as a firm exit in which the plant continues afterwards under 
another firm. This could happen as part of a change in organizational form, a merger or a firm 
acquisition. Even when the firm is bankrupt, the plant could be sufficiently profitable that 
some other firm buys the bankrupt estate in order to continue operations. 
The estimation results for model 5 in Table 5 indicates that the positive duration dependence 
of half exits is more pronounced than that of full exits. This is consistent with the observed 
hazards shown in Figure 3a, where the risk of half exit is initially very low, gradually 
increasing with firm age even before the selection effect is accounted for. Figure 4 is 
constructed in the same way as Figure 2 - Baseline hazards estimated in models 1, 2 and 
3Figure 2, with the observed exit rates for each type of exit in year three as the scaling factor.  
5.3.2 Bankruptcy vs. liquidation 
Bankruptcies are quite different from voluntary firm liquidations. As can be seen from the 
estimation results for model 6 in Table 6, there are significant differences between the exits 
due to bankruptcy and the voluntary liquidation of the firm. Both the duration dependence and 
the estimated effect of explanatory variables differ notably. 
The risk of bankruptcy is not increasing with firm age. The estimates suggest a slight decline 
in the bankruptcy hazard after the third year. The risk of liquidation, on the other hand, is 
significantly increasing with firm age. This implies that the upward slope estimated for the 
aggregate duration dependence in model 4 is driven by liquidations. Further evidence of this 
can be seen from Figure 3b, which shows us that liquidations constitute an increasing share of 
total firm exits as time goes by.  
 
37 
 
 
Table 6 - Estimation results for models 4 and 6 
Log-likelihood
Parameters
Mass points
Variable dummy β SE(β) sign. β  β SE(β) sign. β  β SE(β) sign. β 
age 1 -0.81901 0.05901 *** -0.49066 0.11410 *** -1.22344 0.06307 ***
age 2 -0.30242 0.03710 *** -0.05211 0.05464 -0.40743 0.04746 ***
age 3 (R)
age 4 0.19017 0.03811 *** -0.08372 0.05589 0.22754 0.04754 ***
age 5 0.38973 0.04931 *** -0.13171 0.06973 * 0.44379 0.05743 ***
age 6 0.55597 0.06217 *** -0.17218 0.08670 ** 0.60382 0.07005 ***
age 7 0.71020 0.07495 *** -0.25104 0.11487 ** 0.73773 0.08257 ***
age 8 0.85502 0.09327 *** -0.23350 0.16667 0.82935 0.10449 ***
age 9 0.95815 0.13478 *** -0.03272 0.30924 0.84219 0.14968 ***
new plant (R)
old plant -0.34226 0.06840 *** -0.44207 0.10246 *** -0.18265 0.08572 **
old pl, non-Ltd. -0.77448 0.06286 *** -0.96709 0.10355 *** -0.45381 0.07549 ***
old pl, multi-pl -0.54911 0.14506 *** -0.82397 0.22823 *** -0.12505 0.17691
old pl, non-Ltd. Multipl -0.30135 0.29482 -0.35296 0.44043 -0.31664 0.38320
1996 -0.27211 0.07712 *** -0.44997 0.10183 *** -0.15994 0.15134
1997 -0.15092 0.05106 *** -0.23018 0.06657 *** -0.10389 0.08992
1998 (R)
1999 0.07886 0.04169 * 0.08827 0.05619 0.15533 0.06533 **
2000 0.28046 0.04282 *** 0.38470 0.05986 *** 0.31325 0.06511 ***
2001 0.22762 0.04570 *** 0.44033 0.06627 *** 0.20310 0.06781 ***
2002 0.32369 0.04776 *** 0.47645 0.07067 *** 0.37849 0.06854 ***
2003 0.14769 0.05111 *** -0.00035 0.07724 0.40946 0.07074 ***
2004 -0.39917 0.05693 *** -1.25589 0.09713 *** 0.13122 0.07576 *
1st decile 0.53813 0.06474 *** 0.50378 0.09221 *** 0.56614 0.08147 ***
2nd decile 0.49110 0.06297 *** 0.51538 0.08990 *** 0.44352 0.07992 ***
3rd decile 0.21992 0.06141 *** 0.32781 0.08713 *** 0.10847 0.07894
4th decile 0.14419 0.06114 ** 0.11803 0.08667 0.14241 0.07875 *
5th decile (R)
6th decile -0.13804 0.06248 ** -0.26336 0.09153 *** 0.01770 0.08004
7th decile -0.31175 0.06535 *** -0.42533 0.09698 *** -0.12640 0.08315
8th decile -0.42569 0.06778 *** -0.78181 0.10925 *** -0.07665 0.08466
9th decile -0.32570 0.06920 *** -0.74552 0.11269 *** 0.04340 0.08524
10th decile -0.31379 0.07186 *** -1.09002 0.13199 *** 0.18988 0.08652 **
< -, -5] 0.81810 0.05950 *** 1.48627 0.10878 *** -0.18250 0.07533 **
<-5, 0] 1.20116 0.06733 *** 1.86422 0.12504 *** 0.22438 0.08119 ***
<0, 0.5] 0.05622 0.08224 -0.70415 0.15388 *** 0.39986 0.09502 ***
<0.5, 1] 0.01609 0.07603 -0.29144 0.12746 ** 0.21065 0.08843 **
<1, 2.5] (R)
<2.5, 5] -0.01896 0.05180 0.21229 0.08032 *** -0.18479 0.06305 ***
<5, 10] -0.05842 0.05233 0.21113 0.08124 *** -0.27087 0.06388 ***
<10, 100] 0.31733 0.05494 *** 0.66734 0.08831 *** -0.05983 0.06690
<100, +] 0.48186 0.13711 *** 0.72153 0.20395 *** 0.10489 0.17062
missing 0.83025 0.20891 *** 0.48191 0.32944 0.78452 0.21215 ***
<0, 1] -0.02912 0.04169 -0.00550 0.06112 -0.01407 0.05125
<1, 2] (R)
<2, 3] -0.03444 0.04655 0.03841 0.06671 -0.10063 0.05913 *
<3, 5] -0.01493 0.04763 0.02389 0.06841 -0.05680 0.06106
<5, +] 0.01120 0.04941 -0.17062 0.07358 ** 0.18380 0.06272 ***
<-, 30> 0.17167 0.03958 *** 0.26246 0.05642 *** 0.02390 0.05077
[30, 36> (R)
[36, 42> -0.17427 0.04143 *** -0.25584 0.06190 *** -0.07566 0.05162
[42, +> -0.30873 0.04298 *** -0.62437 0.07113 *** -0.02065 0.05221
missing 0.75192 0.32626 ** 1.29787 0.44554 *** -0.46200 0.46791
<-, 10> 0.10996 0.05999 * 0.24910 0.08383 *** 0.05117 0.07631
[10, 12> (R)
[12, 14> -0.18293 0.03537 *** -0.38782 0.05372 *** 0.06648 0.04492
[14, +] -0.44410 0.05223 *** -1.11829 0.09852 *** 0.01085 0.06130
missing -0.09722 0.10673 -0.24959 0.15346 0.11858 0.13166
[0, 0.4] (R)
<0.4, 0.6> -0.08489 0.05211 -0.19942 0.07658 *** 0.02729 0.06520
[0.6, 1] -0.13596 0.04319 *** -0.37022 0.06490 *** 0.08858 0.05429
missing 0.12847 0.24689 0.43646 0.33560 -0.32919 0.32086
male (R)
female  0.01298 0.04996 0.05877 0.07107 -0.03605 0.06373
missing 0.51237 0.03808 *** -0.24399 0.05574 *** 1.13840 0.05097 ***
private (R)
public  -0.32130 0.27599  0.06859 0.40706 -0.32668 0.34288  
Public vs private 
Ltd.
Model 6
-48442.9693
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Figure 4 -
(a) Mode
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would imply that the age of the plant increases the exit hazard, not just the age of the firm. 
However, this ignores the positive selection of surviving plants. An old plant that continues 
has already survived for some time and proved viable (e.g., as implied by the theory of 
passive learning). More interesting, however, is the finding that the lower exit rate of firms 
started with old plants to a large extent reflects a decreased bankruptcy hazard. Bankruptcy 
does not exhibit a positive duration dependence. A firm with an old plant would therefore 
seem to have a lower aggregate probability of exit mainly because it has a lower probability 
of bankruptcy. The significant coefficients for old plants, in addition to the differences 
discussed between full and half exits, supports the separation of the histories of firm and 
plant.  
Employees 
The estimated coefficients for the size of employment in the first year are not significant when 
we look at all exits, such as in models 2 to 4. The reason is that the coefficients on 
employment have opposite signs for different types of exit, which cancel out if we consider 
all exits together. From model 5, we see that the firms with high employment have a reduced 
risk of full exit, while they have an increased risk of half exit. Similarly, from the estimation 
of model 6 I find that having more than five employees is associated with a higher risk of 
liquidation, but a lower risk of bankruptcy.  
A firm with older and more educated employees has a significantly lower risk of exit than the 
reference firm. This holds for all types of exits except liquidation, for which there are no 
significant coefficients for age and education of employees. These coefficients on age and 
education must be seen in relation to labour productivity, as the labour productivity measure 
includes wages. Older and more educated workers generally earn more, which in itself should 
be reducing the profitability of the firm. On the other hand, the higher wage is also assumed 
to reflect higher average productivity relative to inexperienced and uneducated workers.  
The firms with a large share of female employees is found to have a lower risk of exit than 
firms with more men. As with the other estimated coefficients, we should be careful not to 
assume a causal effect, in this case of women, on the exit hazard. Still, it is very interesting to 
see that a large share of female employees in the first year is associated with a significantly 
lower risk of bankruptcy but no higher risk of liquidation. The risk of bankruptcy is about 30 
% lower for a firm with a female share above 60% than for a firm with female share below 
40%. If women are more risk averse than men, as discussed in the literature on financial 
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decision making (Jianakoplos and Bernasek, 1998; Schubert et al., 1999; Eckel and 
Grossman, 2003), this could be part of the explanation. Female employees may then influence 
the firm to take on less risk, in particular, less debt. Risk averse females may also tend to seek 
out less risky jobs. Rather than influencing the risk-affecting behaviour of their workplace, 
they may then serve as an indicator of more stable firm prospects. A result consistent with this 
is that the risk of half exit, which means a continuation of the plant and thus probably of most 
of the jobs as well, is found to be higher for firms with a high share of female employees. 
Productivity and debt 
Negative debt-to-equity in the first year is, as expected, strongly linked to a high risk of 
bankruptcy. The firms in the very worst category of negative equity have a bankruptcy hazard 
four to five times larger than the reference, and they even have a reduced probability of 
liquidation. Firms starting up with a debt burden this heavy seem more likely to exit through 
bankruptcy rather than liquidation. This seems plausible: Unless the debt-to-equity improves 
before exit, the creditors will demand a bankruptcy process. 20% of the firms in my sample 
has a negative debt-to-equity in their first year. These firms make up 40% of the bankruptcies. 
High values of debt-to equity is also associated with a higher total risk of exit, raising the 
risks of all three types of exit other than liquidation. 
High initial labour productivity is associated with a significantly lower probability of exit. 
This is in accordance with both theory and simple intuition: High labour productivity and high 
profitability indicates a healthy firm. As with many of the other covariates discussed above, 
the coefficients on productivity are larger and more significant for bankruptcy than for 
liquidation. This is probably related to the fact that there are very diverse reasons and 
motivations for liquidation, while bankruptcy is a clearly defined process, initiated because 
the firm is unable to pay its creditors. 
Business cycle and sector shift 
As mentioned in the introduction, sector shifts and business cycle conditions also affect exit 
and entry rates. These are not the focus of this paper, but their effects have been controlled for 
by year and sector dummies. The results show that there are significant differences between 
the exit hazards for different sectors and geographical locations (see Tables 9-11 in the 
appendix). Firms located in the two northernmost counties in Norway have a higher risk of 
bankruptcy and a correspondingly lower risk of liquidation than do Oslo-based firms. 
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Differences between sectors may both reflect persistent differences in the average lifetime of 
firms in the sectors, and sector shifts. For example, hotels and restaurants (sector h) have a 
significantly higher average exit rate than firms in the retail sector (sector g), while the exit 
hazard of firms in health and social work (sector n) is lower.  
The significantly large and negative coefficient on the risk of bankruptcy in year 2004 is most 
likely a result of the registration lag explained in section 4.1.7. This demonstrates the value of 
a calendar control; because it is included in a calendar year dummy, the poor information on 
bankruptcy in 2004 does not affect the estimated duration dependency. 
5.5 Recomposing the exit hazard  
The reported mass points in the NPMLE-models, with estimated intercept hazards iv  and 
assigned probabilities ip , can not be interpreted as representing real groups of firms, they are 
rather a construct to assess the approximate size of the selection effect. Nevertheless, I will 
use the estimates of intercept values and assigned probability for each of the four types of 
heterogeneity estimated in model 4 in a thought experiment. Combined with the estimated 
duration dependence from the same model, I will illustrate the selection effect and the 
duration dependence in a numerical example based on estimated parameters. By combining 
the effect of type and the effect of age, I can reconstruct the gross exit rate.  
The exit hazard for the reference firm was evaluated with all the dummies in the x-vector of 
explanatory variables equal zero. The hazard function for a reference firm of type i  in period 
t  can therefore be simplified to 
 [ ]{ }( , ) 1 exp expit t i t ih γ ν γ ν= − − +   
In order to isolate the duration dependence, consider a case where all firms are of the same 
type. They all have the same exit hazard, starting at the average exit hazard observed in year 
one and scaled according to the estimated duration dependence from year 2 and onwards. This 
correspond to setting the same value of ν  for all firms, in the example so that the average exit 
rate is 6.8% for the first year. The development of the hazard rate of these firms is depicted in 
Figure 5. This is also the shape of the time path of the exit hazard for an individual firm with 
an initial exit hazard equal to the average. Figure 5Figure 5 illustrates the positive duration 
dependence of the hazard function for firm exits. 
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Figure 5 - Duration dependence 
Next, to isolate the selection effect, consider a case where the exit rate is constant for any 
firm, and where the firms can be divided into four groups with different quality parameters. 
The groups can be described by the intercept hazard iν  (reflecting "quality") and the 
probability ip  reported for the four mass points in the distribution estimated for model 4 
(reflecting their relative size). Each group has a time-constant exit hazard, given by the 
reported intercepts, and the share of firms in each group corresponds to the estimated 
probability of each unobserved heterogeneity mass point. This corresponds to setting the 
duration dependence tλ  equal to 0 for all time periods. The average hazard rate of these firms 
would be decreasing in time, because the firms with a low hazard rate makes up an increasing 
share of the surviving firms. Figure 6 depicts the development of the gross hazard rate, in this 
case a result of a selection effect operating on unobserved differences.  
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Figure 6 - Selection effect 
Finally, consider a more complex world, in which there are four types of firms, with four 
different quality parameters iν , each group with the same positive duration dependence given 
by the vector of tλ . In this case, the duration dependence and the selection effect operates 
simultaneously. This corresponds to a weighted average in each time period 1,...,9t =  of the 
four hazard functions 
 [ ]{ }( , ) 1 exp exp   where  1,..., 4.ti t i t ih iλ ν λ ν= − − + =  
In period 1 the weights are given by ip , but from period 2, the weights change because the 
high quality firms constitute an increasing share of the sample. For each year, the weight 
assigned to group i's hazard is the share of type i firms remaining in the sample. The resulting 
gross hazard rate is shown in Figure 7. This gross hazard rate closely resembles the hazard 
curve for model 1 depicted in Figure 2b, in which only observed heterogeneity is accounted 
for. It is upward sloping until a peak in year three before the average hazard slowly decreases. 
In the beginning, the effect of duration dependence dominates the gross development and 
produces an increasing gross exit rate. After the peak at age three, the selection process starts 
to dominate as more and more of the low-quality firms have left the sample. Even though this 
exercise should not be interpreted as a realistic description of the population of firms, it 
illustrates how the opposing forces of type and duration can create gross hazard rates similar 
to the ones we observe in the sample. It may even be that the observed increasing exit hazard 
from year 1 to year 3 is not just a result of sample selection: The observed exit hazard also 
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includes the selection effect from observed heterogeneity, i.e. differences in firm quality 
associated with observable characteristics. This creates a stronger downward bias on the effect 
of age on firm exit compared to what we saw in the above illustration. If duration dependence 
in the population of firms is a stronger effect than selection in the first couple of years, than a 
bell-shaped hazard results.  
 
Figure 7 - Gross hazard recomposed 
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6 Conclusion 
Differences between firms creates a selection process. Some of these differences, such as 
what industry the firm enters, are known to the firm founders before entry, while other 
differences, such as the firm's productivity, demand and the prices it will face, are gradually 
learned after entry. I can control for some of the differences observed in the first year after 
entry, but not all. Controlling for observed differences between firms tilts the hazard function 
upward compared to the observed exit rate. 
It seems plausible that there are significant differences between firms that I am unable to 
control for. This implies that there is still a selection effect, driven by low quality firms 
exiting, on average, earlier than high-quality firms. When modelling this remaining 
heterogeneity explicitly, I get an upward sloping hazard rate. This is the estimated duration 
dependence, namely what is left of the effect of age on the exit hazard when the selection 
process has been filtered out. 
This duration dependence can be interpreted in terms of vintage theories and active learning. 
The contribution from the effect of active learning should be a decreasing exit hazard in firm 
age. Vintage theories predict that the exit hazard increases with the age of capital. Vintage 
theories have also been used to explain the increasing exit hazard in age in long run, such as 
in Dale-Olsen (2005) for firms up to 40 years of age. 
The results in this paper indicate that the total exit hazard of a firm, given the initial quality of 
the firm, increases with firm age even in the short run, e.g., a period of up to nine years after 
firm entry. Positive effects from learning and experience do not seem to be large enough to 
compensate for the negative effects of ageing (primarily thought of as the effect of old capital 
equipment in the theoretical literature). However, the duration dependence of the total exit 
hazard obscures important differences between different types of exit. When looking at 
bankruptcies and liquidations separately, I find that bankruptcies do not exhibit a positive 
duration dependence. Given initial firm quality, the risk of bankruptcy is actually decreasing 
or at worst constant in firm age. This finding is consistent with the idea that active learning 
improves the quality of the firm and hence reduces the exit hazard as more experience is 
accumulated by the firm.  
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Another important difference between bankruptcy and liquidation is that firm specific 
parameters are associated with larger effects on bankruptcy risk then on liquidation risk. This 
includes type of entry, labour productivity, debt-to-equity and the age, education and sex of 
employees. Firms that go bankrupt appear to be a more uniform group, more easily 
characterized even at point of entry. The firms with high debt or negative equity, low labour 
productivity and young, male employees with low education have, on average, a higher risk 
of bankruptcy.  
The magnitude of the duration dependence found in this paper may be exaggerated. But there 
are good reasons to believe that the true duration dependence of firm liquidation is in fact 
upward sloping even in the first years. Even the observed liquidation hazard is upward 
sloping for the first six years. The more differences between firms we do account for, the less 
negative the slope of the hazard function will become.  
It should also be mentioned that the standard errors in these models underestimate the real 
uncertainty as they ignore the uncertainty arising from model specification errors. One source 
of model specification error can be the proportionality assumption. For example, if one of the 
covariates have the effect of altering the time path of the exit hazard, then the estimates are at 
best representing a crude average relationship. This could be the case: As we have seen, 
several of the covariates included in this analysis have opposite effects for different types of 
exit, and the duration dependencies of bankruptcy and liquidation are not at all similar.  
Salvanes and Tveteras (2004) found that the risk of plant exit is decreasing in plant age and 
increasing in capital age, and did not attempt to separate between selection and active 
learning. The omission of capital age in my analysis might affect the estimates in several 
ways. The estimated time path of the exit hazard captures some of the effect from the age of 
capital, if capital age and firm age are in general related. The duration dependence, which we 
interpret as an effect of firm age, will then include the effect of increasing firm exit due to 
higher capital age. The omission of capital age is probably also one of the sources of 
unobserved heterogeneity between firms. The vintage effect is thus likely to be part of the 
explanation for the positive duration dependence for liquidation hazard found in this analysis. 
If we allow for a broad definition of capital in a vintage theory setting, then I believe more of 
the positive duration dependence of liquidation hazard can be understood in terms of the idea 
that old capital can be bad for productivity. The sectors with a relatively high turnover rate, 
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such as retail, cafes and restaurants, are naturally overrepresented in an analysis of entering 
firms, because a larger proportion of firms in such sectors will be new in any given year. The 
sectors mentioned are characterized by relatively low sunk costs, there is not much machine 
capital but rather investment in real estate and equipment which can easily be sold and reused 
by a new firm. For these firms, their name and concept can be important assets. If their 
popularity declines, the owner might decide to change the name, change the concept, and 
maybe even redecorate the interior. The old firm will then exit, and a new firm, with new 
name and new organizational number, will enter with the old plant. In other cases, the owner 
might prefer to sell the plant and try again somewhere else. Such firm exits will not always be 
linked to low productivity, high debt or any other easily identified firm characteristic, though 
in "trend-affected" sectors they do reflect something similar to the vintage effect. 
The analysis identifies some of the key components of the observed exit rate of firms in the 
sample. On the one hand, it represents a mixture of different types of firm exits. The 
introduction of competing risks had a large impact on our understanding of firm exit, and the 
findings clearly supports a distinction between different types of exit. On the other hand, the 
observed exit hazard is composed of both selection effects and a duration component. The 
selection effect is caused by the observed and unobserved differences between firms, and 
many of the firm characteristics I have identified in the sample data can contribute to the 
understanding of why some firms have a higher exit hazard than other. The duration 
dependence of the exit hazard expresses how the age of the individual firm is related to the 
probability of exit in our data. When treating all exits together, I found a positive duration 
dependency. But through the grouping of exits in a competing risks setting, it became clear 
that the average hides substantial differences between different types of firm exits. The risk of 
bankruptcy has no significant duration dependency, it does not change with firm age, while 
the probability of liquidation is increasing as the firms get older.  
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Appendix 
 
Table 7 - Sector definitions 
 
 
Table 8 - Estimation results models 1, 2 and 3: Sector 
Sector code 2-digit NACE 
code
Sector
a 1-2 Agriculture, hunting and forestry
b 5 Fishing
c 10-14 Mining and quarrying
d 15-37 Manufacturing
e 40-41 Electricity, gas and water supply
f 45 Construction
g 50-52 Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles, 
motorcycles and personal and household goods
h 55 Hotels and restaurants
i 60-64 Transport, storage and communication
j 65-67 Financial intermediation
k 70-74 Real estate, renting and business activities
l 75 Public administration and defence; compulsory social 
security
m 80 Education
n 85 Health and social work
o 90-93 Other community, social and personal service activities
p 95 Private households with employed persons
q 99 Extra-terretorial organizations and bodies
z 00 unknown
Variable Dummy β std. β β std. β β std. β
a -0.13698 0.11394 -0.19169 0.16562 -0.19428 0.17150
b 0.04091 0.10194 0.00170 0.15494 0.00718 0.17214
c -0.17834 0.16820 -0.23466 0.23732 -0.25553 0.25082
d -0.05384 0.03535 -0.03234 0.05382 -0.02794 0.05613
e 0.09209 0.16814 0.23414 0.24998 0.26231 0.25883
f -0.13629 0.03484 -0.15532 0.05092 -0.16431 0.05308
h 0.24898 0.03356 0.42146 0.05580 0.44427 0.05834
i -0.09778 0.04317 -0.09445 0.06498 -0.10633 0.06700
j -0.44699 0.11770 -0.54393 0.16539 -0.56740 0.16341
k -0.14336 0.02702 -0.18470 0.04099 -0.19986 0.04358
l 0.69011 0.71282 0.96861 1.50767 1.65132 4.58426
m -0.04111 0.10376 -0.09591 0.15332 -0.07704 0.16889
n -0.46420 0.06923 -0.59556 0.09413 -0.63153 0.10030
o -0.40208 0.05263 -0.59086 0.07737 -0.61472 0.08064
p 0.83142 1.00293 0.97888 1.38836 0.90566 2.25617
z 1.03212 0.11844 1.22357 0.22619 1.49367 0.36665
Sector 
(Reference 
sector g)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Basic Gamma Discrete
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Table 11 - Estimation results models 4, 5 and 6: County
V
ar
ia
bl
e
D
um
m
y
β
st
d.
 β
β
st
d.
 β
β
st
d.
 β
β
st
d.
 β
β
st
d.
 β
Ø
st
fo
ld
-0
.3
22
43
0.
07
58
0
-0
.3
59
21
0.
08
00
7
-0
.2
14
31
0.
15
28
8
-0
.1
75
47
0.
11
01
8
-0
.3
76
80
0.
09
52
2
A
ke
rs
hu
s
-0
.2
04
57
0.
05
73
5
-0
.2
19
19
0.
06
07
3
-0
.1
70
43
0.
11
98
4
-0
.2
59
83
0.
08
59
1
-0
.1
45
57
0.
06
95
4
H
ed
m
ar
k
-0
.2
15
71
0.
08
78
7
-0
.2
25
80
0.
09
28
9
-0
.2
02
38
0.
17
80
5
0.
04
17
1
0.
12
35
9
-0
.4
95
53
0.
11
56
2
O
pp
la
nd
-0
.1
37
16
0.
08
69
3
-0
.1
40
36
0.
09
27
8
-0
.1
29
98
0.
16
66
2
-0
.0
12
57
0.
12
52
8
-0
.2
52
24
0.
11
02
9
B
us
ke
ru
d
-0
.1
09
72
0.
07
14
1
-0
.1
18
80
0.
07
57
9
-0
.0
73
03
0.
14
63
6
-0
.1
19
43
0.
10
52
5
-0
.1
34
22
0.
08
89
4
V
es
tfo
ld
-0
.2
48
88
0.
07
32
7
-0
.2
85
82
0.
07
82
3
-0
.1
33
50
0.
14
81
4
-0
.1
29
15
0.
10
71
9
-0
.3
36
18
0.
09
12
4
Te
le
m
ar
k
-0
.1
28
88
0.
08
96
6
-0
.1
77
88
0.
09
54
2
0.
06
20
0
0.
17
02
3
-0
.1
20
96
0.
13
00
5
-0
.0
99
99
0.
10
94
9
A
us
t-A
gd
er
-0
.2
15
85
0.
10
64
5
-0
.3
06
19
0.
11
47
5
0.
07
07
5
0.
19
18
5
-0
.1
81
01
0.
15
83
4
-0
.1
78
65
0.
12
83
8
V
es
t-A
gd
er
-0
.2
83
83
0.
08
74
6
-0
.3
38
48
0.
09
45
3
-0
.0
93
20
0.
15
75
2
-0
.4
33
85
0.
13
70
4
-0
.0
99
06
0.
10
26
3
R
og
al
an
d
-0
.1
32
37
0.
06
09
5
-0
.1
41
68
0.
06
46
6
-0
.1
52
35
0.
12
21
1
-0
.1
74
58
0.
09
24
9
-0
.0
97
66
0.
07
37
1
H
or
da
la
nd
-0
.2
76
67
0.
06
14
1
-0
.2
91
69
0.
06
52
9
-0
.2
75
32
0.
12
75
3
-0
.0
30
82
0.
08
92
4
-0
.5
49
48
0.
07
75
4
So
gn
 o
g 
Fj
or
da
ne
-0
.2
71
12
0.
10
42
3
-0
.2
74
75
0.
11
08
5
-0
.3
46
52
0.
21
04
7
0.
07
29
9
0.
15
18
0
-0
.6
73
38
0.
13
49
8
M
ør
e 
og
 
R
om
sd
al
-0
.2
09
62
0.
07
68
3
-0
.2
16
02
0.
08
16
0
-0
.2
54
46
0.
15
56
8
0.
07
40
6
0.
10
78
2
-0
.4
60
94
0.
09
86
3
Sø
r-T
rø
nd
el
ag
-0
.1
50
18
0.
06
96
3
-0
.1
90
74
0.
07
43
6
0.
04
50
6
0.
13
60
3
-0
.0
76
05
0.
10
37
4
-0
.2
55
22
0.
08
62
8
N
or
d-
Tr
øn
de
la
g
-0
.1
92
47
0.
09
95
4
-0
.1
71
44
0.
10
46
1
-0
.3
46
28
0.
21
68
0
0.
05
40
0
0.
14
24
1
-0
.4
44
79
0.
12
62
6
N
or
dl
an
d
0.
14
69
9
0.
07
22
2
0.
18
38
4
0.
07
65
2
-0
.0
87
76
0.
14
59
8
0.
56
78
7
0.
10
50
9
-0
.5
21
63
0.
09
79
0
Tr
om
s
-0
.2
05
18
0.
08
86
5
-0
.2
04
00
0.
09
39
8
-0
.2
80
20
0.
17
76
9
0.
06
47
1
0.
12
48
2
-0
.3
82
01
0.
11
08
5
Fi
nn
m
ar
k
0.
00
40
5
0.
10
77
0
0.
07
66
7
0.
11
56
4
-0
.5
66
33
0.
24
12
2
0.
42
26
8
0.
14
58
4
-0
.4
62
30
0.
14
31
3
Sv
al
ba
rd
-0
.7
44
69
0.
87
46
3
-0
.8
32
94
0.
92
13
0
-0
.5
94
09
1.
24
27
2
-2
.1
84
50
1.
61
53
0
0.
26
49
6
0.
77
80
5
U
nk
no
w
n
1.
89
07
7
0.
22
57
8
1.
86
87
9
0.
24
03
5
2.
22
05
5
0.
37
54
2
2.
12
64
7
0.
32
50
3
1.
57
25
4
0.
25
64
6
C
ou
nt
y 
(R
ef
er
en
ce
 
O
sl
o)
M
od
el
 4
M
od
el
 5
M
od
el
 6
A
ll 
ex
its
Fu
ll 
ex
it
H
al
f e
xi
t
B
an
kr
up
tc
y
L
iq
ui
da
tio
n
